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To review Lorenzen's Fourth Edition, Kuhn's Commentaries t Private Inter-
national Law and Harper and Taintor's Cases ot Conflict of Law is to witness a glorious
sunset, endure an interlude of darkness, and then, enjoy a brilliant sunrise.
Within the limits which Lorenzen has set, his casebook is a masterpiece. A review
of its structural organization, however, is unnecessary for the new edition follows
essentially the pattern of prior editions.' The basic philosophy has been preserved.
Although the number of chapters has been increased from seven to thirteen and one
hundred ninety-five new cases have been added and seventy-three omitted, the over-
all length of the volume has not been altered.2 A much too short introductory chapter
(sixty-four pages) on the history of conflicts, domicile, and qualification and renvoi
begins the new volume. Jurisdiction and foreign judgments have been divided into
two chapters, as have torts and workmen's compensation. The administration of
estates has been expanded into three chapters on decedent estates, trust estates, and
debtors' estates. Commercial arbitration provides a thirteenth chapter.
As ever, Lorenzen's new edition is a most teachable book and a most useful guide
to the substantive materials on conflicts of law. Nevertheless the reviewer believes
that casebooks written on this model have come to the close of their day. The writings
of Cook, and Cavers, and Lorenzen himself are having their effect and at least atten-
tion is being given to the much neglected prechoice of law problems which to the
practice forever will be the more difficult and the more significant.3 This change can
be only a credit to Lorenzen himself, for while in his four editions he has not made
this re-emphasis, surely without them the change would have been delayed.
To turn to Kuhn's text book is to turn to darkness-for like the night it covers all
things. And like the night, there is little illumination. After the introductory chapters
on "Historical Development" and "General Nature and Scope" the book strives to
compare the civil and common law conflicts rules on nationality and domicile, jurisdic-
tion and procedure, status and capacity of persons, the contract and status of marriage,
dissolution of the marriage status, parent and child, property, contracts, foreign torts,
and succession upon death. To cover this multitude of subjects in the short space of
347 pages of text necessarily has produced a condensation which results in platitudes,
generalities, omissions and inaccuracies.
The discordant note with which the chapter on foreign torts is opened epitomizes
the spirit of the entire volume. "Justice demands that wrongs be redressed even if
they occur outside the jurisdiction."4 But what is "justice?" Is it everywhere equal
I Lorenzen, p. vii. "The arrangement of materials in this edition is substantially that of
the third."
2 This is particularly remarkable because in addition to the many new cases, "Introductory
Notes" to chapters and sections have been added, as have law review and "restatement"
material.
3 See the discussion of Harper and Taintor, infra, p. 706. 4 Kuhn, p. 304.
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and the same? "Who" demands in the name of justice? What are "wrongs"? In
short, the careful scholar will be distressed by Kuhn's cavalier treatment. The in-
clusion of the classical landmarks of Machado v. Fontes and The Halley affords but
little additional assistance in escaping from the Scylla of the concept and the Charybdis
of result. The classical territorial theories of conflicts in the field of torts have run
afoul of perplexing complexities in Young v. Masci,S in Scheer v. Rockne Motor Corp.6
and in Dallas v. Whitney.7 Similar cases are legion, but their problems escape this
volume. In short, this chapter and the entire volume contains only the most general
references to abstract (i.e., meaningless) common law "principles." There is little
analysis, less criticism, and no consideration of the problems as "conflicts problems."
The volume is written with an uncritical acceptance of a conceptualistic view of
the law of conflicts. Apparently all literature and case material which throws doubt
upon the perfection of this theory has been excluded. And this exclusion can not be
forgiven. I do not suggest that Mr. Kuhn must accept other theories or rationales of
conflicts cases, but without their recognition one cannot but doubt the adequacy of
the volume. The omission of critical law review writings is legion. Outstanding among
the omissions is the failure to cite or discuss Cook's articles on "The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws," s "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws,"9
"Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," ° and "'Contracts' and the Conflict of
Laws." Whether you accept or reject Cook's point of view is your business, but it
must be patent to all that without the inclusion and discussion of this point of view
a treatise can hardly be considered scholarly.
Thus, so far as the common law materials are concerned the book appears to be
indubitably deficient, and this is particularly unfortunate for the true merit of Kuhn's
work was to make available civil law materials to the common law lawyer. The
suspicion, based on the inadequacy of the treatment of common law rules naturally
extends to the civil law materials. So far as this reviewer is concerned it can be sus-
picion only. Suspicions, perhaps, are unfair, and extrapolation from what we know
to what we do not know is usually dangerous. The suspicion itself, however, repels
further investigation. And the Arctic night already is too long, and the reviewer is
eager to turn to the light of a newer day which Harper and Taintor promise in their
Cases on the Conflict of Law.
This casebook is of normal size and dimension. At this point its similarity with
existing conflicts books ceases. The editors have taken a bold stroke. Unlike Lorenzen
who dedicates but 52 pages to domicile and therein inserts what materials he uses on
"qualification" and "renvoi," Harper and Taintor devote their first 345 pages to
"Foreign Elements in Legal Relations." This is the first serious attempt to present
in a casebook the method which makes conflicts a separate body of legal learning.
In the past casebooks have shunned this problem not only because of its uncom-
promising complexity but also because the romantic couple-the territorial theory
and the renvoi-turned out to be incompatible. Eventually the deficiencies of renvoi
and the absurdity of the hypothesis that choice of law rules produced uniformity
had to be disclosed in casebook form. Harper and Taintor have done this.
S 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
6 68 F. (2d) 942 (C.C.A. 2d 1934). 9 42 Yale L. J. 333 (1933).
7W. Va. 188 S. E. 766 (1936). '0 35 Cal. L. Rev. 202 (1935).
8 33 Yale L. J. 457 (1924). 131 Ill. L. Rev. 143 (1936).
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Part I of Harper and Taintor's volume is so attractive in its focus on the basic
question of what is the conflicts technique as distinct from what happened in tort or
contract cases that the reviewer is tempted to extend the discussion to unreasonable
lengths. Certain that the book review editor would not permit this he hopes that his
enthusiasm will incite your curiosity to read and revel as he has.
Part II carries forward the same basic inquiry and asks the question "When Will
Courts Adjudicate Controversies Involving Foreign Elements?" Three chapters re-
duce the conceptualistic limits of jurisdiction and judgments to the more significant
inquiries, "When Will Foreign Elements Affect the Legal Desirability of Adjudica-
tion," and "When Will Foreign Elements Affect the Constitutional Limitations on
Adjudication." Conversely, Part III considers "Foreign Elements Regarded as Legal-
ly Insignificant." Part IV, the last part of the volume, considers the issue of choice
of law or "When Foreign Elements are Regarded as Legally Significant." The choice
of law problem consumes less than half of the volume. This reduction of emphasis
on substantive differences in local law rules seems highly desirable. It is, of course,
always grievous to lose old friends, and many of the classical cases do not appear in
this shortened part on choice of law. But new friendships will grow as strong and will
perhaps be more delightful.
It forever may be perplexing that a person is treated as married in one state and
not in another; but the marriage relation as a legal problem seldom arises singly.
Economics is ever intruding. Thus a court must frequently decide whether a case
should be treated as a status case, a domicile case, or a property case. For as it starts,
so will it finish. Thus, this reviewer believes that the emphasis on qualification which
Harper and Taintor have injected into this volume is indispensable to an intelligent
prediction on the issue of choice of law."2
To date, no casebook has endeavored to present these materials with an adequacy
which they deserve. Thus, this volume may well mark the beginning of a new day
for conflict of laws casebooks. It is well edited, concisely organized and footnoted.'3
Balanced in length and content it should be a thoroughly teachable book.
12 See Harper and Taintor, p. 258, quoting Arminjon as follows: "How can we know what
law is applicable to a legal relation without having first determined the nature of that relation?
Qualification must necessarily precede the choice of law for, when two laws seem simultaneous-
ly applicable and when they qualify differently the relation in question, there is not one but two
relations depending upon whether we consult one or the other law ..... To act otherwise
would be to suppose competent, a priori and arbitrarily, one of the conflicting systems whose
applicability must be established by means of one of the choice of law rules of that legal system
must decide the question. That question can be decided only after its elements have been
defined and classified by means of the rules of qualification of that legal system."
'3 In some instances the cases have been too concisely edited, i.e., the facts in Loucks v.
Standard Oil, p. 21, are omitted to the detriment of the case. This has occurred frequently in
the early part of the volume. The footnotes are not mere repositories of authority but guide
the student in the development of the problem. Cross-referencing of cases, however, would
improve the volume at numerous points and the citation of all the law review materials con-
tained in the footnotes in the table of books and articles-scarcely a fourth of them appearing
-would facilitate its use. Occasional typographical errors will no doubt be corrected in
future editions.
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The weather report for the new volume: "Clear, with fresh but moderate winds."
And from the old prophets, perhaps, "storms of protest." Fnmc E. HoRAcK, JR.*
The Good Society. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1937.
Pp. xxx, 390. $3.00.
Since its first publication early last fall, Mr. Lippmann's book, The Good Society,
has been the subject of a good deal of highly divergent comment. Within my own
observation, the highest note of praise has been that struck by Mr. Horace J. Bridges,
of the Chicago Ethical Society. "The work," says Mr. Bridges, "has stirred me to
great enthusiasm. For twenty years I have been consciously waiting and longing for
just such a book as this ..... [It is] a work worthy to stand in the line of succession
to the First Book of Hooker, to Milton's 'Areopagitia,' to Locke's 'Treatises on
Civil Government,' to Burke and Adam Smith, and to John Stuart Mill.", In contrast
to the enthusiasm of Mr. Bridges are the opinions of Mr. Lippmann's ex-brother
socialists. From them has come a chorus of assertion and innuendo, that Mr. Lipp-
mann has simply "sold out"; and even the relatively moderate Max Lerner, though
absolving Mr. Lippmann of any conscious dishonesty, observes significantly that
"Mr. Lippmann is a rich man; [that] his friends are the possessors of the earth; [and
that] he is their prophet." His book is described as "a rationalization of the economic
claims and political fears" of his friends, and he is accused of "fleeing to the Nirvana
of political inaction. '2
It does not seem to me that The Good Society itself gives much support to any of
these views. It is, most decidedly, not a great book; it is rather dull, much below
Mr. Lippmann's own standard as a piece of writing,3 and confused and inconsistent in
its substance almost from beginning to end. On the other hand, it seems to me equally
certain that the book is not a plea for inaction, and, though confessedly a product of
a period of personal bewilderment and wishful thinking on the part of its author, it
is, I think, about as honest as tracts of its kind usually are.
"I began to write," says Mr. Lippmann, "in a mood of protest but without much
hope." He has been "bewildered," he says, ever since the War. Yet his occupation
forced him into daily comment upon critical events with no better guide to their
meaning than his own "hastily improvised generalizations." His "predicament,"
was "not pleasant."4 He speaks of "weariness" and "discouragement," of "the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School.
'Bridges, Mr. Walter Lippmann's "Good Society": An address to the Chicago Ethical
Society (1937).
2Lerner, Lippmanu Agonistes, The Nation (Nov. 27, 1937). See also Marshall, Columnists
on Parade VI: Walter Lippmann, The Nation (April 23, 1938).
3 Any one doubting this estimate should compare The Good Society with Mr. Lippmann's
Method of Freedom of 1934, which dealt in a prefatory way with somewhat the same subject
as his present book.
4 It is hard to believe that Mr. Lippmann was aware of much "bewilderment," or that he
felt his predicament "unpleasant," when he wrote his Preface to Morals. See, especially,
chapters xii and xiii. The Preface to Morals was published in May 1929; the stock market
crash, it will be remembered, came in October.
